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are bound to concede that of late there is an apparent tendency
to the opposite rule.
17I. It has been strenuously contended that the mortgage should
define on its face not only its purpose as security for future advances, but the limits of the advances or liabilities it is intended
to secure, and Chancellor KENT seems to have entertained this
opinion: 4 Comm. 176; but the weight of authority is strongly
the other way, and it may now be considered well settled to the
contrary; L, le v..Ducomb, 5 Binn. 585 ; Moroney's A)peal, 12
Harris 372; Shlrras v. Caig, 7 Cranch 84; Craig v. Tappin, 2
Sandf. Ch. 78 ; Robinson v. Milliams, 22 N. Y. 885 ; Collins v.
J. T. M.
Carlisle, 13 Ills. 254.
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Where a husband charges his wife before a justice of the peace, with having
threatened him with personal violence, and fails to sustain such charge, he will be
held liable to the attorney of the wiie, in an action brought to recover for services

rendered upon her retainer.
Whether his presence when the services were rendered, and making no objection
thereto, would make him liable on an implied promise to pay for them, querre.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Ontonagon county.
facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

The

The opinion of the court was delivered by
LYON, J..-It appears, by the complaint and evidence in this

action, that the defendant prosecuted his wife before a justice of
the peace, to compel her to find securities to keep the peace, pursuant to the provisions of chap. 175 of the Revised Statutes.
On his complaint, charging that she had threatened to commit
personal violence on him, the justice issued a warrant for her
arrest, and she was arrested and brought before such justice for
examination.
Mrs. Heiden thereupon employed the plaintiffs, who are attorneys at law, to defend her upon such examination, which duty
they performed.
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The magistrate decided that the prosecution had failed to prove
that there was just cause to fear that such threatened offence
would be committed by the accused, and discharged her from
custody. It further appears that Mrs. Heiden was living with
the defendant, and was supported by him at that time.
This action was brought by the plaintiffsI to recover of the defendant (the husband) the amount of their bill for services. It
is admitted that the services were not rendered at the husband's
request, and that he has never expressly promised to pay for
them. The plaintiffs recovered judgment for the amount and
costs of suit, which judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court
and from that judgment the defendant has appealed to this
court.
The question to be determined is, whether the defendant is
legally liable for the services of the plaintiffs rendered by them
under these circumstances.
The husband is under legal obligation to support his wife, and
nothing but wrongful conduct on her part can free him from such
obligation. If he fails to provide her with suitable and proper
necessaries, any third person who does provide her therewith may
maintain an action against him for the same: 1 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, § 553. The same learned author, in the following section (sect. 554), thus defines what are necessaries which
the husband is bound to furnish to his wife:"And in general we may say that necessaries are such articles of food or apparel, or medicine or such medical attendance and nursing, or such provided means of locomotion or provided habitation and furniture, or such provision for her protection
in society, and the like, as the husband, considering his ability
and standing, ought to furnish to his wife for her sustenance and
the preservation of her health and comfort."
This definition of necessaries seems to us to be strictly correct,
and unless the services of the plaintiff come strictly within itunless they were necessaries within the meaning of the law-in
the absence of any agreement by the defendant to pay for them,
the plaintiff ought not to recover in this action.
Were the professional services of the plaintiffs necessaries fur,
nished to Mrs. Heiden for which the defendant is liable?
It is well settled, both in this country and in England, that
where the conduct of the husband is such that it becomes neces-
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sary for the wife to exhibit articles of the peace against him for
hcr safety and protection, the husband is liable for the necessary
expenses of the proceedings including attorney's fees. The leading case in England on this subject is tflat of Slhepherd v. liacone,
3 Camp. 326 ; and in this county Morris v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123,
seems to be a leading case on the same subject.
Sepherd v. 11facone was an action on an attorney's bill for
business done on the retainer of the defendant's wife. It appeared that the defendant without just cause had turned his wife
out of doors with circumstances of great violence, and that she
exhibited articles of the peace against him prepared by the
plaintiff.
The first part of the plaintiff's bill was for his services in preparing such articles. Lord ELLENBOROUGII said, "The defendant's
liabilities for the first part of the charge will depend upon the
necessity of exhibiting articles of the peace against him." * * *
"But if she was turned out of doors in the manner stated, she
carried along with her a credit for whatever her preservation and
safety required; she had a right to appeal to the law for protection, and she must have the means of applying effectually; she
might, therefore, charge her husband with the necessary expense
of this proceeding as much as for necessary food and raiment."
Mlorrisv. Palmer,supra, was also an action upon an attorney's
bill for services rendered on the retainer of the wife of the defendant in a prosecution instituted by her against her husband,
and which resulted in an order being made by the magistrate
before whom the proceedings were pending, requiring him to
enter into recognisance for his good behavior. The defendant
was held liable to pay the bill, and EASTMAN, J., who wrote the
opinion, after stating the general principle of law, that the husband is liable for necessaries furnished to the wife, says, "It
appears to us that these principles, carried out, must make the
husband liable for the necessary costs incurred in a prosecution
against him upon complaint of the wife for a breach of the peace.
It is as important that her person be protected from brutal outrage and violence, as that her necessary food and clothing should
be supplied. Both are for her preservation, and her husband
should be as much bound to fulfil her contracts in the one case as
in the other." "The case of violence, however, would seem to
be one of the greater necessity." (p. 126.)
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All of the cases cited by counsel of defendant in their brief,
with a single exception, are divorce cases, and all of them, I
think, without exception, admit that the above cases of Shepherd
v. lVfacone and Morris v. Palmer were correctly decided.
Now, if the husband is liable on the retainer of the wife to an
attorney for professional services rendered by him in exhibiting
articles of the peace against the husband (there being sufficient
grounds therefor), it seems to us that he must be liable in like
manner where the husband exhibits similar articles against her,
and causes her arrest on a groundless charge. If the seryices
of the attorney are necessaries in the one case, we think that
their character is the same in the other case.
The defendant had caused his wife to be arrested, and was
endeavoring to co.mpel her to find sureties to keep the peace, or
in default thereof to send her to prison. He had made a charge
against her which he was unable to substantiate; he had withdrawn from her that protection which it was his duty to give her,
and had, without cause, put her in custody, and was endeavoring
to use the machinery of the law to inflict upon her still greater
evils.
True, he did not beat her with a club, nor lock her in a dungeon, but he deprived her of her liberty, and endeavored in a
certain contingency to have her confined in the county jail for a
period not exceeding six months, and this without cause. It is
idle to say that under the circumstances of this case legal advice
and assistance was not necessary for her protection and safety.
And the same being necessary, and having been rendered by the
plaintiffs, all of the cases hold the principle, and we now add another to the list, that he must pay therefor.
I am inclined to think that the action can be maintained on another ground. It was proved at the trial that the defendant was
present when the services in question were rendered by the plaintiffs, and made no objection thereto.
The case of Shepherd v. Macone, supra, is an authority for holding that from such failure to object, a promise by the defendant
to pay for such services may be fairly inferred.
In that case a part of the plaintiff's bill was for defending the
wife upon an indictment against her for keeping a bawdy-house.
Lord ELLENBOROUGH said, "With respect to the defence upon
the indictment, as the defendant knew and approved of the busi-
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ness his wife carried on, and was aware of the prosecution without expressing any dissent to the plaint if's defending her, I think

a promi~e may be fairly inferred on the part of the defendant to
pay the plaintiff for his labor in conducting the defence."
We do not rest our decision, however, on any implied promise
by the defendant to pay for those services, but put it upon the
grounds above stated, of the husband's liability to pay for necessaries furnished his wife, as long as she is free from wrongful
conduct.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
When the court in the above case held cent, her attorney should be fully justithat the attorney was entitled to recover fied in looking to the husband for payfor services rendered to the wife, because ment of his fees.
The true policy of the law and the
she was shown to have been innocent,
and rested the liability of the husband dictates of justice demand that time husupon that ground, though its decision band and wife should stand on equal
may perhaps have been strictly in ac- ground when they are parties litigant;
cordance with authority, it is certainly and this can only be accomplished by
open to criticism on the ground of being holding that the wife has power to bind
opposed to the true principle, that every her husband for necessary counsel fees,
one is to be presuned innocent until otherwise she is denied substantial jusproved guilty; and an attorney who in tice for being unable to contract for the
good. faith undertakes the defence of a payment of such fees herself, she must
wife, if entitled to recover from the his- have the power to bind her husband,
band for his services, is justified in rely- and it cannot be maintained at the preing on that presumption of law, and sent day, that counsel can be found who
should be held as so entitled without would be willing to expend their time
regard to the fact of whether the inno- and labor in the defence of a client's
cause, if their only chance for remuneracence of the wife is proved or not. If
this is the true doctrine it follows that tion depended upon establishing the inthe above decision should not have been nocence of such client to the satisfaction
placed on the ground that the wife was of a jury.
The cases in which a husband may be
prorcd innocent of the charge preferred.
If the husband is bound to pay his
wife's counsel fees, on the ground that
they are neces-ary for her protection in
society, he should be hel I liable irrespective of the fact of her guilt or innocan' e ; certainly in those cases where
lie is the party plaintiff, for whatever
reason there inay be for holding that an
attorney who acts for a wife, when she
is the plailtilt, must run the risk of determining whether lier cause is mneritorious ; there can be none, where she is

defendant, she being presumably inno-

called upon to pay his wile's counsel
fees, are properly divisible into two
claisz. tho-e in i hich lie is the party
plaintiff, as the libellant in a suit for
divorce, or the complainant in a case
like time one in point, and those in which
the wife is the plaintiff in similar suits ;
anl it is in the former that her right to
bind lier huband should Lc unquestioned, she is as much entitled to necessary couniel fees to e. ahli- h her innocence as she ii to the ncce-saries of life
while it is being tried, and lier right to
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bind her husband for the latter cannot
be disputed.
The authorities on the subject are extremely meagre; most of the cases where
the question has arisen, have been suits
for divorce, and in the courts having
cognisance of such suits, their peculiar
practice has enabled them to answer one
great argument in favor of holding the
husband responsible in all cases, namely,
the argument of the impropriety of
making the counsel of the wife the judge
of the merits of his client's case, at the
peril of losing his fees. For in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, and in
the Chancery Courts in this country,
where such suits are generally if not
always determined, the practice is to
make an order in the very beginning of
the proceedings for the payment of the
wife's counsel fees where such order is
deemed proper, and if this is refused,
the counsel for the wife at least knows
at the very outset upon what he has to
rely, and the responsibility of determining the merits of the defence is thrown
upon the proper person. Yet even these
tribunals have apparently appreciated
the distinction between cases in which
the husband was the libellant or plaintiff,
and those in which the wife was, and if
they are shown to have inclined towards
making the husband responsible whenever he was plaintiff, it furnishes an
argument in favor of the doctrine contended for.
In Bird v. Bird, decided in 1753, and
reported in 1 Lee 209, the bill for a
divorce was filed by the husband on the
ground of nullity, by reason of a former
marriage by the wife; on an application
for payment of the wife's counsel fees,
Sir GEonE LEE decreed that the husband should pay them. "I must presume," he says, "till the contrary is
proved, that the wife is so de jure as well
as de facto, otherwise she would be
guilty of bigamy and a felon ; but the
law presumes her innocent until proved

guilty, and I will therefore presume her
his lawful wife."
Again in The Countess of Portsmouth
v. The Earl, 3 Addams 63, the bill of
the husband charged fraud in the wife
in procuring the marriage; it was nevertheless held that an order on the husband to pay the wife's counsel fees was
proper, Sir CHRISTOPHER loBINsoN
saying, "I am unable to distinguish this
case from Smith v. Smnith, in which the
court refused to proceed until tunds
were provided to enable the wife to conduct her defence."
These were certainly strong cases for
denying the right of the wife to have
counsel fees, if such ever exist where
she is defendant, and yet the court held
such right !to be undoubted, and evidently on the ground that she must be
considered innocent until proved the
contrary; then why should an attorney
undertaking her defence be held to a
stricter rule ?
In Brown v. Ackroyd, 5 E. & B. 819,
where a suit was brought by the proctor
of the wife, to recover costs from the
husband, incurred in prosecuting a divorce on the part of the wife against the
husband, CAMIPBELL, C. J., in his opinion says: "The rule is that the proctor
must show that there was reasonable
cause for instituting the proceeding,"
if there was not he cannot recover, and
"I am of the opinion that no such reasonable cause has been' shown." -In
this case the wife was the applicant for
the divorce; and though the petition for
the payment of her counsel fees was not
made to the court in which the divorce
was determined, as in the other two
cases, it still shows that her counsel is
held to a stricter rule than when she is
defendant.
This was directly asserted by CHURCH,
C. J., in Shelton v. Pendleton, 18 Conn.
417, where a suit was also brought by
the wife's counsel to recover of the husband for services rendered in the prose-
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and in favor of holding the husband responsible whether he is plaintiff or deJustice, "is respondent and defends her- fendant; in this last case Judge KING
self against tle application of her hus- says: ,"Iam convinced that the husband, the practice is uniform, in case of band, plaintiff or defendant, is obliged
her inability, to order him to provide to pay the expenses incurred by his wife
funds for her defence; but we have in prosecuting or defending a divorce.
never known such aid to be furnishedto Otherwise, in many cases a wifm being
her when she was the prosecuting party." in poverty must fail in a just suit instiThe principle of this case was followed tuted by her, or be defeated in an unjust
in Mhforrison v. Holt, 42 N. H. 478, the one prosecuted by her husband against
court making tile distinction between her."
cases where the wife was plaintiff or deThis appears to have been the ruling
fendant; and also in Dorsey Y. Goodenow, motive of Judge LEwIs in the case of
Wright's Ch. Rep. Ohio 120, and John- Graves v. Cole, 7 Harris 171, where an
son v. |Williams, 3 Iowa 97.
action was brought against a husband to
In Phillips v. Simmons, 20 How. Prac. recover certain expenses incurred by his
N. Y. 342, where a suit was brought wife in defending a suit for a divorce.
by the wife for a divorce and afterwards In his opinion the judge says: "The
discontinued, in an action by her counsel wife having no separate support must
to recover his fees from the husband, it be subsisted and her necessary costs
was said that the wife cannot be con- paid, pending proceedings for a divorce,
sidered the agent of the husband to otherwise she might be denied justice
commence an action against himself and for want of the funds required for the
make him liable to her attorneys for the vindication of her rights, and for this
costs; while an action is pending the reason she may in general have her costs
wife in a proper case may obtain an taxed de die in diem.
Now, while it is true that the foregoorder that the husband furnish her with
means for carrying it on; but when she ing authorities, being in cases of divorce,
is plaintiff in such action her attorneys and mostly of courts having jurisdiction
have no claim on him for the expensesof the original suit, fail in that respect
however, in W rightv. Mright, 1 Ed- to expressly establish the rule, that in
wards's Ch. 62, the court made an order another action a husband will be held
on the husband to pay the wife's counsel liable for professional services rendered
fees, although the bill for a divorce was to his wife, whenever she is defendant
filed by the wife; so also in Murray v. in an action brought by him; they
Murray, 1 Edwards 382, and previously nevertheless show very conclusively the
in Denton v. Denton, I Johns. Ch. C. strong tendency of the law in that di365, and Mix v. Mix, 1 Id. 110. But rection, and being manifestly in accordthe fact that the strict rule laid down in ance with the dictates of justice and the
the above case of Shelton v. Pendleton reason of mankind, would probably have
has not always been followed, furnishes a controlling influence if adverted to in
no argument for contending that tile future cases, in sustaining the doctrine
payment of the wife's counsel fees is that the husband must pay his wife's
ever refused where she is the defendant. counsel fees in all cases in which she is
The present practice of the Ecclesias- dfendant in ail action brought against
tical Courts seems to be in accordance her by himself, and irrespective of the
with the principle laid down by KING, fact of her guilt or innocence.
W. WY'.%.E .WisTr, Jr.
J., in Melizet v. Afelizet, I Parsons 78,
cation of a divorce on the part of the
wife. "When the wife," says the Chief
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Supreme Court of Mlichigan.
GEORGE H. GALE v. THE VILLAGE OF KALAMAZOO.
Where the proper village authorities having power to make contracts on its
behalf, assume officially to enter into an engagement which only the corporation
could properly make, and in so doing declare themselves and their successors
bound by its conditions, it will be deemed the contract of the corporation, and not
of the officers.
The trustees of a village are incompetent to make a contract by which the
governing authority abdicates any of its legislative powers, or by which it is precluded in the future from legislating in regard to any emergencies that may arise.
The trustees upon whom arc conferred the legislative powers, are vested with
no discretion to circumscribe their limits, or diminish their efficiency, but must
trasmit them unimpaired to their successors.
A contract, by which the village of Kalamazoo bound itself to take charge of a
market-house for a period of years, and to provide by ordinance for renting the
stalls, and confining the sale of certain articles thereto, created a monopoly, was
contrary to the policy of the law, And could not be tolerated.
No action lies on such contract against the trustees of the village, for a refusal
by the villageto exercise its corporate legislative powers in taking charge of the
market-house and renting the stalls.

THIS was an action brought by George H. Gale against the
village of Kalamazoo, for -a breach of contract in refusing to
exercise the legislative powers of the village, to carry out an
agreement for renting the stalls, and regulating the sale of certain articles in the Public Market-House.
In consideration of the plaintiff's building a market-house to
be known as the Kalamazoo Public Market-House, and placing
the same under the control of the village authorities for ten years;
the village undertook to rent the stalls from year to year for such
rents as they and the plaintiff should agree upon, and to have
the same attended to by a competent manager. And furthermore
agreed that during the continuance of the contract there should
be no other public market-house in the village, provided this
proved large enough.
By a village by-law passed at the time of the contract, it was

provided that the sale of all articles therein mentioned, should,
(luring market hours, be confined to the said market-house.
The village authorities refused to carry out the agreement, and
contended that the contract divested the corporation of some of
its legislative authority, and that it created a monopoly in its
markets for the benefit of an individual.

GALE v. KALAMAZOO.

H.

. Severens and D. D. Hughes, for plaintiff.

6. JT. _. Lothrop and

.

Walker,
W
for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, J.-The objection made by the defendants, that the
contract sued upon appears to be the contract of the president
and trustees of the village of Kalamazoo as individuals, instead
of the contract of the village itself, does not appear to us well
founded. The averment in the declaration is that "the said plaintiff and the said defendant entered into their certain contract or
agreement in writing, which said contract or agreement sealed
by the said plaintiff and by the said defendant by its agents and
servants, the president and trustees of the village of Kalamazoo,
executing the same and having full power and authority so to do,
and to bind the defendant thereby, is in the words and figures"
which are given in full. This averment is sufficient to embrace
whatever was essential to confer upon the president and trustees
the proper authority to make the contract on behalf of the village; and it must be taken to be the contract of the corporation
unless the instrument, as thus set out, shows upon its face that it
is the contract of the officers and not of the corporation. We
think it entirely clear from the terms employed that it was intended to be the contract of the village; and although the words
used are not the most suitable for expressing in clear legal language the intent to bind the corporation, yet, when the proper
village authorities having power to make contracts on its behalf,
assume officially to enter into an engagement which only the corporation could properly make, and in so doing declare themselves
and their successors in office bound by its conditions, the purpose
by this language to bind the corporation i too evident to be
brought in question. We think there is no waiit of due formality
here, if the contract in its essentials is one the village had the
power to enter into.
The question whether by this instrument the corporation has
not assumed obligations not warranted by the law, is one of considerable importance, and possibly of some difficulty. It is
argued on the one hand that the village authorities have undertaken ly this instrument to divest the corporation of some portion of .ts legislative authority, and to create a monopoly in its
markets for the benefit of the plaintiff, while on the other it is
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insisted that there is nothing unusual in the contract, and That
in making it the village has not gone beyond the ordinary exercise of municipal authority in the regulation and control of village markets. These diverse views have been presented with no
ordinary ability and force, and we find it necessary to examine
somewhat in detail the various provisions of the contract from
which such different conclusions are drawn.
The plaintiff, it appears, undertook to build a market-house, to
be known as the Kalamazoo Public Market, and to be placed
under the control of the village authorities for ten years. The
authorities were to rent the stalls from year to year, or for such
other times as might be agreed upon, for such rents as they and
the plaintiff should fix upon, and to pay over the rents to the
plaintiff. In consideration of the building of the market-house,
the village undertook to have it attended to and supervised by a
competent manager or clerk of its own appointment, whose duty,
among others, it should be to require the observance of all ordinances or by-laws adopted by the president and trustees of the
village for the purpose of properly regulating the market-house,
and the vending of meats, fish, poultry, game, fruit, vegetables,
eggs and butter, within the corporate limits of the village. The
village also undertook that during the continuance of the contract
there should be no other public market-house in said village, provided the market-house to be built by the plaintiff should prove
large enough to accommodate the public for the purposes aforesaid, and that the sale of all the articles above specified within
the corporate limits of said village should, during market-hours,
be confined to said market-house, or on the ground specified in a
village by-law relating to public markets, referred to in said contract, and which was passed at or about the date of the contract
with a view to giving it effect.
These are the main provisions of the contract which the plaintiff avers has been fully performed on his part. The general
purpose was to induce a private citizen to erect a market-house
for the village, the authorities undertaking, in order that he might
be compensated therefor, to confine the marketing of the citizens,
during market hours, to the building and its vicinity, to appoint
a proper officer for the enforcement of all by-laws and ordinances
relative to the market and to the vending of market articles, and
to control and rent the stalls for the benefit of the plaintiff.
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There can be no doubt whatever that such a municipal corporation, if possessing under its charter the usual powers, would
have the right to provide itself with the proper building for a
public market, either by renting, buying or contracting for the
building of the same, and that its contract for that purpose would
be binding upon it to the same extent as would be the contract
of an individual in a matter pertaining to his own private business. Indeed, in providing its members with this convenience.
this public corporation would be acting in no different capacity
than would any pi'ivate corporation in providing any convenience
for the discharge of its corporate functions, and there could be
no difference in the legal rules, which would be applicable. The
legislative power of the village might be called into exercise in
order to the giving of the proper authority for the contract, but
in entering into the contract the village must be regarded in the
light merely of an individual proprietor. And had the village
in this instance contracted to pay the plaintiff for his market
building when constructed, or for the rent thereof, the questions
now before us could not have arisen. Such a contract would not
in any manner have hampered the legislative authority of the
village; for though irrevocable, it would not have precluded the
authorities from abandoning the use of the building for market
purposes at any time, or from establishing other markets, if in
their opinion the convenience of the public would be better subserved thereby.
The contract in question, however, is not only entered into in
pursuance of an exercise of legislative authority on the part of
the village, but it undertakes to control that authority in several
important particulars.
1. It requires the appointment of a competent manager or
clerk to attend to and supervise the market-house, and to require
the observance of the ordinances and by-laws relative to the
marketing within the village. For this purpose legislative action
would have been essential, and must consequently have been
within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was
made :
2. It bindb the authorities not to permit any other markethouse, providc'l the one erected bv the plaintiff should prove
large enough to accommodate the public; and
VOL. XX.-19
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3. It undertakes that the authorities shall restrain the ordinary
marketing within defined bounds.
In each of these particulars this contract differs widely from
one which should merely put the city in possession of a markethouse to be controlled and disposed of according as subsequent
circumstances should appear to render desirable. Suppose, in
order to illustrate the difference, that the village, after, a year's
experiment, should be satisfied that market limits and a markethouse were not desirable; that it was better that every person be
allowed to sell where he could find customers, and to buy where
he could procure what he needed, and that a manager or clerk
of the market was unnecessary; in the one case, the village
might have upon its hands a building for which it had no need,
but in the other, if this contract possesses any legal validity, it
would have obligated itself for a term of years to continue a
system which experience had demonstrated was not for the public
good. Or, suppose the subsequent growth of the village should
demonstrate that the location chosen for the market-house was
not the proper and suitable one, though the market itself was needful; in the one case, by proper exercise of legislative authority,
a new site might be chosen, but in the other the village would not
only have bound itself to continue a useless market, but would
have precluded itself from the establishment of one which would
accommodate the public needs.
If a municipal corporation can preclude itself in this manner
from establishing markets wherever they may be thought desirable, or from abolishing them when found undesirable, it must have
the right also to agree that it will not open streets, or grade or
pave such as are open, or introduce water for the supply of the
citizens except from some specified source, or buy fire-engines of
any other than some stipulated kind, or contract for any public
work except with persons named; and if it might do these things,
it is easy to perceive that it might not be long before the incorporation itself, instead of being a convenience to its citizens, would
have been used in various ways to compel them to submit to
innumerable inconveniences, and would itself constitute a public
nuisance of the most serious and troublesome description. Individual citizens, looking only to the furtherance of their private

interests, might in various directions engage it in permanent contracts, which, while ostensibly for the public benefit, should im-
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pose obligations precluding future improvements, and depriving
the town prospectively of those advantages and conveniences
which the municipality was created to supply, and without which
it is worthless. For if the village might bind itself to one market-house for ten years, it might do so for all time to come, and
if it might agree that improvements and conveniences of one
class might be confined by contract to one quarter of the town,
a reckless or improvident board might agree with a greedy or
unscrupulous proprietor of town lots that all improvements of
every description should be so located or made as to conduce to
his benefit, irrespective of that of the general good.
It will not do to say of such a contract that it must be assumed
to have been reasonable, in view of the actual condition and wants
of the village, and of its probable growth and future needs.
What would be thought proper for the village this year, might be
found worse than useless the next, and no official prescience could
determine with absolute or even tolerable certainty what changes
a few years might work. Indeed it is impossible to predicate
reasonableness of any contract by which the groverning authority
abdicates any or its legislative powers, and precludes itself from
meeting in the proper way the emergencies that may arise. Those
powers are conferred in order to be exercised again and again,
as may be found needful or politic, and those who hold them in trust
to-day are vested with no discretion to circumscribe their limits or
diminish their efficiency, but must transmit them unimpaired to
their successor. This is one of the fundamental maxims of goveriment, and it is impossible that free government, with restrictions for the protection of individual or municipal rights, could
long exist without its recognition.
But there is at least one feature of the contract which would
invalidate it, even if we were to be confined to a consideration of
existing facts, andi were at liberty to assume that the circumstances bearing upon its reasonableness would continue unchanged
for the whole period of ten years. Not only was the marketing
to be confined to one locality, but the plaintiff was to have an
unlimited right to control the occupation of the market-house
through the power given him to deterni,,e the rents to be paid by
lessees. This vested in him a practical monopoly of tie public
market, and though it is possible that he might exercise his rights
impartially as between dealers, and with an eye to the public
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good, we cannot lose sight of the fact so well stated in the old
case of monopolies, that "the end of all these monopolies is for
the private gain" of those who hold them: Davey v. Allain, 11
Rep. 84; Broom Const. L. 238. They are founded in destruction of trade, and cannot be tolerated for a moment. In the
brief for the plaintiff it is sought to meet this difficulty by the
provision in the village ordinance that the leasing of stalls should
be by auction; but we do not find in the contract anything which
binds the plaintiff to assent to the rent offered at auction, or
which would preclude him from arbitrary discriminations among
bidders. Nothing appears to us plainer than that the plaintiff, in
fixing upon the rents that were to be paid for his benefit, was to
have a substantial control, and this may fairly be assumed to
have constituted an important inducement to him in entering into
the contract. It is also argued on behalf of the plaintiff that
the village cannot be at liberty to dispute the validity of the contract until it is found actually to impede the proper exercise of
municipal powers, and that even then it must givb way only so
far as it shall be found to constitute an obstruction; but the
declaration shows that the breach of contract complained of is a
refusal to exercise the corporate legislative powers in taking
charge of the market and renting its stalls, and an actual exercise of such powers by a repeal of the ordinance relative to markets. We can have no occasion to consider what force there may
be to this argument in a case to which it may be applicable, when
the case before us is one where the ground of complaint is that
the village has exercised a legislative discretion vested by law
exclusively in the municipal authorities, and upon the continuous
and unlimited possession and exercise of which no restraints or
limitations can be imposed themselves, or by any other authority
than the legislative power of the state.
We have not so far considered what the effect upon the contract might have been had section thirteen added to the ordinance
relative to markets been in force when the contract was entered
into. That section appears to have been adopted February 3d
1868, and provided that whenever in the judgment of the corporate aulhorities the market-house should be too small, or from
any cause not sufficient to meet the wants of the public, it should
be lawful for the corporate authorities to establish other markethouses, or permit the sale of articles named in the ordinance by
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any person or persons anywhere within the corporate limits. The
contract bore date May 11th '1867, and though it is said the
plaintiff does not complain of this amendatory section of the
ordinance, it is clear that he had the same right to complain of
it, so far as it affected the stipulation of the contract, that lie had
to complain of any other act in disregard of those stipulations.
Our conclusion is that the village has incurred no liability to
the plaintiff by the acts and omissions complained of, and that
the judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
The other justices concurred.

United States Circuit Court, Southern District of New Ykork.
WILLIAM A. BRITTON v. BENJAMIN F. BUTLER.
Although commercial intercourse between the states in insurrection and those in
occupation of the United States during the late war was unlawful, and therefore
a bill of exchange drawn in Mississippi on a person in New Orleans while the
latter was under control of the Federal army was void, yet a capture of such bill
by the United States commander did not authorize him to collect and confiscate
the money in the hands of the drawee in New Orleans.
Whether money voluntarily paid by the drawee under such circumstances can
be recovered back, not decided.
An action of asstimpsit to recover money so seized, not within the statute of
March 3d 1863, limiting actions for arrests or imprisonments under color of authority of the United States to two years.

17ose & JcDaniel, plaintiff's attorneys.
counsel.

E. P. Fheeler, of

.Develin, .3Iiller &' Trull, defendant's attorneys.
Develin, of counsel.

Joltn E.

I3LATCIIPORD, J.-TThis suit was brought in a state court and

transferred into this court. Tite declaration is in assumpsit, on
the money counts and an account stated. The damages are laid
at $15,000, and the causes of action are alleged to have occurred
at New Orleans, in the state of Louisiana, on the 1st day of September 1862. The defendant pleads the general issue and two
special pleas. To each of the special pleas a special demurrer is
interposed by the plaintiff, alleging defects in substauce and form.
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The first special plea avers that, from the 24th of February
1862, until the 16th of December 1862, the defendant was a
major-general of volunteers, duly commissioned by the President,
in the service of the United States, and was assigned to the military geographical department of the Gulf, including within its
,bounds the state of Louisiana, and, as such commander so assigned,
took possession of the city of New Orleans and the adjacent portion of said state of Louisiana, and held the same by the armed
forces of the United States, of which he was in command in time
of war, and, with such armed forces, was engaged in carrying on
the war and suppressing the recent rebellion against the United
States, then having broken out into public territorial war in said
state of Louisiana and the adjacent states of Mississippi and
Texas; that by due proclamation, according to the customs and
usages of war, martial law was declared and proclaimed and obtained in said department from the 1st of May in said year 1862,
all the time till the 16th day of December in said year, and during
all said time the defendant was acting under the orders and proclamations of the President of the United States, and in administration, and in virtue and under color of the Acts of Congress ;
that, on the 16th of August 1861, pursuant to the statutes of the
United States in such case made and provided, the inhabitants
of the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and other states, were,
by a proclamation of the President of the United States, declared
to be in a state of insurrection against the United States, and
that all commercial intercourse should cease, as by such proclamation will fully appear; that, at the time of the promises and
undertakings, and of the supposed grievances complained of by
the plaintiff, and subsequently thereto, such proclamation was
and remained in full force and virtue ; that, on or about the 1st
of September, in said year, the pickets of the armed forces of
the United States then under the command of the defendant, and
stationed on the outer lines of the camp or garrison of New Orleans, for the protection of said camp or garrison against the
enemy, captured a person endeavoring to'make his way furtively
from the lines and territory occupied by the enemy, to wit, from
the city of Natchez, in said state of Mississippi, then in the
armed occupation of the enemy, to the said city of New Orleans,
then in the armed occupation and possession of the United States
forces aforesaid; that there were found concealed upon the per-
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•on so captured two or more drafts, checks, or bills of exchange,
drawn by persons or firms doing business in said city of Natchez,
then in the occupation of the enemy, upon persons or firms doing
business in the said city of New Orleans, then in the occupation
of the United States forces; that thereupon the defendant, as
such major-general, and in obedience to the orders and proclamations of the President of the United States, and in the administration and in virtue and under color of the Acts of Congress
in such case made and provided, captured said drafts, checks or
',ills of exchangc and caused the proceeds thereof, when collected, to be turned over to the treasury of the United States,
which said proceeds have been duly passed upon, audited, and
credited to liiui by the order of the President of the United
States; and that out of the acts and doings aforesaid, and not
otherwise, arose the said several causes of action of which the
plaintiff complains.
Under the provisions of the 5th section of the Act of July
13th 1861, 12 U. S. Stat. at Large 2-57, and the proclamation
,,f the President of' August 16th 1861, Id. 1262. the inhabitants
of the states of Mississippi and Louisiana (with certain specified
exceptions) were declared to be in a state of insurrection against
the United States, and all commercial intercourse between the
said states of Mississippi and Louisiana and the inhabitants thereof, and the citizens of other states and other parts of the United
States, was made unlawful after the date of said proclamation,
with the said specified exceptions. One of those exceptions excepted from the inhabitants of the state of Louisiana the inhabitants of such parts of that state as might be from time to time
occupied and controlled by forces of the United States engaged
in dispersing the insurgents against the laws, Constitution, and
government of the United States. On the facts set up in the
first special plea it clearly appears that on the 1st of September
1862, and when the matters alleged in the said plea took place,
commercial intercourse between the state of Mississippi and the
city of New Orleans was unlawful. That being so, the drafts,
checks, or bills of exchange mentioned in that plea, drawn by
persons doing business in Natchez, Mississippi, on persons doing
business in New Orleans, were illegal and void instruments: The
Ouachita Cotton, 6 Wall. 521, 530; JT'oods v. Wilder, 43 New
York 164.
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The defendant contends that, as the bills of exchange were
thus void, they were subjects of confiscation ; that as martial law
prevailed, and there were no courts and no civil authorities, the
bills of exchange became confiscate at the will of the commanding
general, without any of the ordinary processes of law; that the
bills thus became the property of the United States, in the hands
of the general in command; and that he, on behalf of the United
States, and as its agent, collected the amounts for which they
were drawn, being the same moneys to recover which this suit is
brought, and that that is a defence to the suit. It is difficult to
see how the consequence logically follows the .premises. If the
bills of exchange were void, then, even if they were confiscable
by mere seizure, it is difficult to see how their seizure and confiscation passed a title to the United States to the moneys in the
hands of the drawees of the bills in New Orleans, which the defendant sets up that he afterwards received as a collection of the
bills. The bills are not averred to have been accepted by the
drawees before they were seized. The confiscation, by the seizure, if of anything, was merely of the naked pieces of paper
seized. It gave no valid claim to the United States to collect
from the drawees the moneys expressed in the bills. If the moneys
were seized in the possession of the drawees, the transaction was
no different from what it would have been if the bills of exchange
had never been drawn or seized. If the moneys were voluntarily
paid by the drawees to the defendant, on a demand for them, as
being drawn for by the bills, the bills being void instruments,
their seizure could confer on the United States and on the defendant no title to receive or retain the moneys, which they would not
have had if the bills had never been seized or presented. The
transaction set up in the first special plea comes down, then, to
this, that the defendant, by order of the President of the United
States, either took or received the moneys referred to, which are
the moneys sued for.
If the defendant took the moneys by seizing them, the act, so
far as the special plea shows, was unlawful. The moneys are not
therein alleged to have been forfeitable or subject to seizure for
any cause whatever. No Act of Congress, or proclamation or
order of the President is referred to, which made such moneys
forfeitable or liable to seizure. They were not seized while passing between loyal and disloyal territory. They were in loyal
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territory. The plea is, that the defendant, having captured these
void drafts in the discharge of his duty, took away from the persons who were the drawees of the drafts, certain moneys belonging to the plaintiff, and paid them into the treasury of the United
States, and that, by the order of the President of the United
States, those moneys have been passed upon, audited, and credited
to him. There is no warrant for saying that the transaction, as
set up in the plea, if one of seizure, was lawful. The moneys.are
not even averred to have been the'property of an enemy or of an
insurgent. The fict that the drawers of the bills, which are
alleged in the plea to have been drafts, checks, or bills of exchange, were within the insurgent territory, and that the bills
were drawn there, although it may warrant the presumption that
the drawees were debtors to the drawers to the amount of the
bills, does not warrant the presumption that the moneys in the
hands of the drawees were not the moneys of the drawees, or were
the moneys of persons within the insurgent territory, or were the
moneys of the enemy. The case, then, as one of seizure, is one
of the seizure, in loyal territory, of the moneys of persons in
such territory, not alleged to have been enemies of the United
States.
Even if the moneys were the property of an enemy of the
United States, or were the representative of debts due to such
enemy, the plea sets up no authority for their seizure. The mere
declaration of war does not confiscate enemy property, or debts
due to an enemy, nor does it so vest the property or the debts in
the government, as to support judicial proceedings for the confiscation of the property or debts, without the expression of the
will of government, through its proper department, to that effect.
Under the Constitution of the United States, the power of confiscating enemy property and debts due to an enemy is in Congress alone: Brown v. United ,States, 8 Cranch 110. In legislating
on tile subject, Congress has passed various acts, but none of them
authorize the confiscation of moneys situated as the moneys in
this case are alleged by the plea to have been situated. The Act
of August 6th 1861, 12 U. S. Stat. at Large :319, provides for the
seizure by the President, and the condemnatio,, by judicial proeceding-i, of property acquired or disposod of with intent to employ tie same in aiding the insurrectioii, and property knowingly
so employed. The Act of July 17th V362, Id. 589, provides for
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the seizure by the President, and the application to the support
of the army of the United States, through judicial proceedings,
of the proceeds of the property, money, credits, and effects of
persons holding office under the insurgents, and of persons owning property in loyal territory, who aid the rebellion, and of
persons in the rebel states, in arms or aiding the rebellion, who
do not return to their allegiance within sixty days after warning
by proclamation. The Act of March 12th 1863, Id. 820, provides for the confiscation, through judicial proceedings, of property
coming from within the insurgent states into the loyal states,
otherwise than according to regulations prescribed by that act.
All of these acts provide for a seizure only with a view to judicial proceedings. Even if a seizure in this case was lawful, no
judicial proceedings are set up, but only a turning over of the
moneys to the treasury of the United States.
Considered as a capture of documents constituting the evidence
of debts due to an enemy (if that is predicable of unaccepted
bills), and as giving the right to capture the moneys, representing the debts, as the property of the enemy, the transaction
stands in no different posture. The bills captured were not the
debts. The possession of the unaccepted bills gave no right to
the captors to take physical possession of the moneys of the
drawees, and could have no effect to divest or affect the title of
the drawees to such moneys, or their right of possession in the
samc: ilalleck on International Law, c. 19, § 8.
The Act of March 2d 1867, 14 U. S. Stat. at Large 432, is
invoked in aid of the plea. That act provides that all acts and
orders of the President, or acts done by his authority or approval,
after March 4th 1861, and before July 1st 1866, "respecting
martial law, military trials by courts martial or military commissions, or the arrest, imprisonment, and trial of persons
charged with participation in the late rebellion against the United
States, or as aiders or abettors thereof, or as guilty of any disloyal practice in aid thereof, or of any violation of the laws or
usages of war, or of affording aid and comfort to rebels against
the authority of the United States, and all proceedings and acts
done or had by courts martial or military commissions, or arrests
and imprisonments made in the premises, by any person, by the
authority of the orders or proclamations of the President, made
as aforesaid or in aid thereof," are thereby approved in all
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respects, legalized and made valid, "to the same extent and with
the same effect as if said orders and proclamations had been
issued and made, and said arrests, imprisonments, proceedings
and acts had been done under the previous express authority and
direction of the Congress of the United States, and in pursuance
of a law thereof previously enacted, and expressly authorizing
and directing the same to be done." It also provides, that no
court shall have or take jurisdiction of, or in any manner reverse
any of the proceedings had or acts done as aforesaid, nor shall
any person be hld to answer in any of said courts for any act
done or omitted to be done, in pursuance or in aid of any of said
proclamations or orders, or by authority or with the approval of
the President within the period aforesaid, and respecting any of
the matters aforesaid ;" and that "all officers and other persons,
in the service of the United States, or who acted in aid thereof,
acting in the premises, shall be held, *primdfacie, to have been
authorized by the President." This act applies solely to "the
matters" and " the premises" mentioned in it, and those do not
embrace the transaction set up in the plea. The fact that martial law obtained in New Orleans on the 1st of September 1862,
does not, on the allegations in the plea, make an order of the
President authorizing or approving the seizure of these moneys,
an act or order of his respecting martial law, or make the act of
the defendant in seizing the moneys an act of his respecting martial law within the meaning of the statute. There is nothing in
the mere existence of martial law which, on the facts alleged in
the plea, justifies the seizure of the moneys. In the case of
The Venice, 2 Wall. 258, the Supreme Court, referring to the
reoccupation of New Orleans by the forces of the United States
in lay 1862, and to the proclamation of the commanding general
on the 6th of that month, declaring the city to be under martial
law, and also declaring that "all the rights of property, of whatever kind, will be held inviolate, subject only to the laws of the
United States," says that, under the Act of July 13th 1861, and
the proclamation of the President of August 16th 1861, the city
of New Orleans, after its actual, substantial, complete, and permanent military occupation and control by the United States, in
May 1862, could not be regarded as in actual insurrection, nor
could its inhabitants be regarded as subject, in most respects, to
treatment as enemies, and that such military occupation and con-
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trol drew after it the full measure of protection to persons and
property consistent with a necessary subjection to military government. The plea sets up no necessity for the seizure of the
moneys, and no justification therefor, within these principles.
If the moneys were voluntarily paid to the defendant, and not
seized by him by military power, the fact that he received them
as major-general, and in obedience to the orders of the President,
and paid them into the treasury, and that such payment has been
approved by the President, cannot vary his liability for them to
the plaintiff, if he would be liable for them in case no such fact
existed, on evidence to be adduced by the plaintiff under his
declaration. Whether, if the case ever comes to trial on the
plea of the general issue, the plaintiff can make out the defendant's liability, is another question. All I mean to say is, that if
the defendant is otherwise liable, the facts set up in the plea constitute no defence to the action.
The demurrer to the first special plea must, thereforc, be
allowed, with leave to the defendant to amend, on paymeit of
costs.
The second special plea avers, that the pretended acts which,
if true, would give to the plaintiff the supposed causes of action
mentioned in the declaration, were performed, if performed by
the defendant, as a major-general of volunteers in the army of the
United States, duly commissioned by the President, and under
and in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and the orders
and proclamations of the President, and during the late rebellion
of the Southern States against the authority of the General Government of the United States; and that said supposed causes of
action did not, nor did any or either of them, accrue within two
years next before the commencement of this action, nor within
two years after March 3d 1863.
The statute relied on as supporting this plea is the 7th section
of the Act of March 3d 1863, 12 U. S. Stat. at Large 757, which
enacts that no suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, shall be
maintained for any arrest or imprisonment made or other trespasses or wrongs done or committed, or act omitted to be done,
at any time during the present rebellion, by virtue or under color
of any authority derived from or exercised by or under the President of the United States, or by or under any Act of Congress,
unless the same shall have been commenced within two years next
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after such arrest, imprisonment, trespass, or wrong. may have
been done or committed, or act may have been omitted to be
done, provided that in no case shall the limitation herein provided commence to run until the passage of this act, so that no
party shall, by virtue of thig act, be debarred of his remedy by
suit or prosecution until two years from and after the passage of
this act." It is sufficient to say that this suit is an action of
assumpsit, and is not a suit for an arrest or imprisonment made,
or a trespass or a wrong done or committed, or an act omitted to
be done, during the rebellion. Moreover, the plea does not aver
that the "pretended acts" which it refers to, were arrests, or imprisonments, or trespasses, or wrongs. The 4th section of the
same act makes an order of the President, or under his authority,
made during the existence of the rebellion, a defence only to
an action or prosecution, civil or criminal, "for any search, seizure,
arrest, or imprisonment made, done or committed, or acts omitted
to be done under and by virtue of such order, or under color of
any law of Congress."
The nature of the action, for the purposes of the demurrer to this plea, can be judged of only by the
declaration.
The demurrer to the second special plea is, therefore, allowed,
with leave to the defendant to amend on payment of costs.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.
WASHINGTON FORD v.JAMES SURGEr.
During the late war cotton was trcated by both belligerents as quasi contraband
of war and liable to seizure or destruction.

Acts done by the military authorities of the Confederate '4atcs within the legitimate sphere of war, do not render the doers liable to private parties whose property may have been injured thereby.
Defendant, under the order of a Confederate provost-marshal. burned plaintiff's
cotton, both parties being at the time within the linei of a Confederate military

district and subject to the Confederate authority. IIeld, that defundant was not
liable for the loss to plaintiff.
SIMRALL, J.-The pleas in bar set up in substance, that the
people and state of Mississippi in combination and confederation
with Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, and other states known as the
Confederate States, were waging war against the United States.
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That by an Act of the Congress of the Confederate States, cotton
liable to fall into the hands of the hostile belligerent, was by the
military to be destroyed. That General P. G. T. Beauregard
was the commander of the army having possession and control
of the state of Mississippi. That he, as such commander, directed
an order to A. K. Farrar, Provost-Marshal of Adams county, to
burn the cotton on the Mississippi river and the railroad. That
said Farrar commanded the defendant and one Minor to execute
it, by burning cotton on certain specified plantations on the Mississippi river, and that by authority thereof defendant did destroy
the plaintiff's cotton.
The question, not free of difficulty, is whether these facts
excuse or justify the act complained of as a trespass. That
again requires an inquiry into and an ascertainment of the status
of the respective belligerents towards each other during the war.
We propose this inquiry, simply and purely as a legal problem,
to be deduced from the principles announced by the Supreme
Court of the United States, the final arbiter of such questions.
It may not be easy to draw principles from the publicists to be in
all circumstances safely applied to the latewar. It were a safer
process of reasoning to look to the leading historical facts, as
exerting a controlling influence over legal questions arising out
of them. Such was the course of the Supreme Court in the
Prize Ca9es, 2 Black 673. It will be remembered that the President in the recess of Congress, April 1861, issued his proclamations declaring a blockade of certain ports. Captures were made
on the high seas, and the question was whether the vessels could
be condemned as prizes of war. It was conceded by the court
that the President could not declare or initiate a war against a
state or states. But he was charged by the Acts of 1795 and
1807 with the duty of using military means to suppress an insurrection or repel an invasion. Capture and condemnation as prize
are belligerent rights, and are only lawful in war. The court
concluded that the insurrection at once culminated in civil war.
Referring to the facts, "That it was not a loose, unorganized
insurrection having no defined boundary'or possession. It acted as
states claiming sovereign power over persons and property within
their limits, several of which states had combined to form a new
Confederacy." "South of its military lines it is enemy's country
held in possession by an organized military power." "All per-
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sons residing within this territory, whose property may be used
to increase the sinews of the hostile power, are in this contest
liable to be treated as enemies." From such premises the court
determined that the blockade was a rightful measure to aid in
overcoming the insurrection, 'and was conclusive that a state of
war existed.
A civil war is never preceded by a declaration. It becomes such
by its accidents, the number, power, and organization of those
who engage in it. The declaration of independence, the organization of great armnies, the commencement of hostilities, induced
some of the powers in M.ay 1861 to recognise the insurgents as
belligerents, and gave to the conflict the character of "war."
The court in the same case quote, approving the language of
Vattel laying down the rules which apply in civil wars, "The
nation is divided into two independent parties, who consider each
other as enemies and acknowledge no common judge. Having
no common superior to judge between them, they stand in precisely the predicament of two nations who engage in a contest,
and have recourse to arms." In 2d Wallace 419, it is repeated
that the war was governed by the principles of public law, as
alike applicable to civil and international wars, and that all the
people inhabiting the insurrectionary states must be regarded as
enemies and their property as enemies' property.
The President, by the Act of 13th July 1861, was directed to
issue his-proclamation declaring what states and parts of states
were in insurrection, and thereupon intercourse and commerce
was forbidden with such territory, and thereupon it was impressed
with the status of hostile territory until the national authority was
re-established. The executive proclamation was so issued, the
17th of August of the same year, so that the late domestic war
had two distinguishing features. First. From its careful and
orderly organization, the magnitude of its proportions, and the
strength of its resources, it at once assumed the proportions of
war. Secondly. It had a territory of defined boundaries within
which for a time it exerted supreme authority. In the means
adopted by the United States for its suppression, these were
accepted facts, and the measures were suited to the exigencies.
The inhabitants and their property, whether of citizens or foreigners, were for many purposes (pending the conflict) tainted as
hostile. As in foreign wars blockades were instituted, captures
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made upon the high seas, and condemned as prize of war. It
was no defence in the Prize Court to allege that the vessel or its
cargo was the property of a foreigner, or a citizen of friendly
and loyal sentiments towards the United States. If the cargo
was the product of the hostile territory, it was lawful prize. If
the vessel was trading with it, that condemned it.
Ordinarily in the practice of modern times, movable property
is not treated as spoils of war, except that an invading army may
levy contribution or take without compensation food for its subsistence, and animals for military purposes.
in the late war both belligerents regartled cotton as a co.nmodity of special and peculiar importance, not in the sense of its
intrinsic value or its worth as an article of commerce simply. It
was looked to by the Confederates as the chief source of credit,
and the means by which armies and munilions of war were to be
procured. It was regarded also as an element of power to influence favorably the western nations of Europe, so largely engaged
in its manufacture and dependent greatly on this country for
supply. It is well known that the Confederate Government was
a very large owner of cotton, bought for the purpose of being
used to procure military supplies and munitions. The exclusion
of American cotton from the consumption of the world, had
advanced its price in the manufacturing states, and in Europe, to
very high rates. It became the policy of the Confederate belligerent to prevent cotton falling into the possession of the United
States. Therefore, it was ordered by law of the Confederate
Congress that when so exposed it should be destroyed. Thus,
cotton became quasi contraband of war, indirectly to one of the
belligerents a chief munition and source of supply, to the other
a strengthening of resources, and a weakening of the adversary.
Hence, in Mrs. Alexander's Case, 2 Wallace 418, whilst
accepting the general rule to be that "private property, under
the modern usages of war, is not subject to seizure for the sake
of gain," and ought to be "restricted to special cases dictated by
the necessary operation of the war," yet cotton formed an exception to the general rule on account of the peculiar character of
the property. Because "1the rebels" regarded it as one of their
main sinews of war, "1and their g6vernment (rather than permit
it to fall into the possession of the national troops) has everywhere
devoted it to destruction, however owned." "It was liable to
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destruction, rather than that it should remain an clement of
strength to the rebellion."
The capture of Mrs. Alexander's
cotton and its condemnation was justified, both on the grounds
of' public policy and under the Act of Congress of August 6th
1861, making all property employed in aid of the rebellion, with
the consent of tle owner, to be lawful subject of capture and
prize wherever found. It was because of the special value
attached to this property as a means of prolonging the conflict
that the United States considered it on motives of policy, subject
to seizure and aplropriation ; and the Confederate belligerent in
order to prevent a 1main sinew" of the war from falling into the
possession of the United States forces, devoted it to the flames.
It follows, therefore, that it was a lawful belligerent act in certain
circumstances to destroy cotton. To relieve the party engaged
in it from civil responsibility to- the owner, he must be in such
relation to the Confederate belligerent as to give the act the
character of belligerency and hostility; his conduct must be
guided and prompted by military authority.
No rights of sovereignty pertained to the Confederate States.
As to the United States, the Confederate States was an usurpation. It was not a de facto government, its legislation was a
nullity having no effect or validity in law: Thorington v. Smith,
8 Wallace 9; United Atates v. .Ieelder, 9 *Wall. 86. Therefore, in the last of these cases it was held that a postmaster
of the United States was not justified in paying money over to
the Confederate Government or its officer, because a law of theConfederate Congress so required. The law itself was no justi-.
fication. The act could only be excused when accomplished by
a vis major.
It is averred in the pleas that at the time the plaintiff's cotton
was burned, the county of Adams was in the possession of and
subject to the insurgent authority, capable of enforcing obedience, and constraining the conduct of the inhabitants. It was
represented by the military power, A. K. Farrar was ProvostMarshal under General Beaurcgard as his superior. The order
came from the general to the provost-marshal, and through him
to defendant and one Minor. The pleas negative the idea that
the burning was voluntary, wanton. or malicious. I k inferable,
inasmuch as the command was given to the defendant, that he
was amenable to the authority of the provost-marshal. Ic was a
VOL. XX.-20
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military command originating with the highest authority in that
district. Whilst those engaged in waging war against the United
States might (after the war was over) be held to account by the
sovereign for a breach of their allegiance; yet, whilst it lasted,
for all hostile acts done, they could rightfully appeal to the privileges and immunities of the public law as members of a belligere at
power. The destruction of certain sorts of private property.
such as provisions, beasts of burden, or their amotion bey,;nd the
reach of the enemy, ought to be referred to and adjudged of by
the exigencies of war. It is a legitimate belligerent right to
destroy whatever private property is the subject of seizure and
condemnation in order to prevent it coming into the use of the
enemy. It would hardly be claimed, that the Confederate general who ordered the destruction of thousands of bales off cotton
(whatever may be thought of ttre wisdom of his conduct) on the
evacuation of New Orleans, could be held to account to the
owners as a trespasser. His plea would be that he did it to prevent the property enuring to the benefit of the captors as spoils
of war.
An order of the military power in the control of the country
with means to compel obedience, directed to and executed by the
persons named (as in this case to burn cotton) is a belligerent act,
as much so (according to the policy of both belligerents) as the
strategetic movement of an army or a battle. The legislation of
the Confederate Congress or of the state affords no protection as
imparting legality to the act. The Confederate Government, in
judicial questions like this, can receive no other consideration
than as the organized head of the insurgent power, part of the
combination by arms to overthrow the National Government and
Union. The only import of such legislation is to supply evidence
that the insurgent belligerent regarded cotton as its chief resource
to supply the means of war, and therefore justified the policy of
the United States to treat it as- quasi contraband of war, and
subject to seizure. But who is to judge of the propriety of
General Beauregard's order through the provost-marshal? There
was no tribunal competent to stay it, or adjudge of its fitness and
validity. Farrar as a subordinate had no discretion. He was
subject to obey. Those to whom he intrusted its execution bore
towards him the same relation that he did to his superior. In
the view which we have taken of the subject we think the defence
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is complete when it is ascertained that burning the cotton was a
hostile belligerent act in obedience to military order. The fact
that the order was given to Surget and Minor necessarily implies
that they were subject to obey.
It was said by the Chief Justice in Texas v. White, 7 Wallace
700., that whilst belligerent rights were conceded, the United
States studiously avoided any other recognition of the Confederate
States than as a part or as the organ of the military power. Whatever might be rightfully done in a foreign war by a belligerent in
the prosecution of hostilities could be done by the Confederates:
.Jlrraiz v. Insurance Co., 6 Wallace 10, 11, 12, 13; Hanger v.
Albott, Id. 335, 6, 7. The principle having this extent of application, has been repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court of the
United States. But whilst this concession is made it has as often
been declared that the sovereign, because of it, foregoes none of
his rights to deal with his citizens for taking arms against him.
All that we mean to affirm is, that acts considered legitimate in
the prosecution of hostilities, do not render the doers of them
amenable to make reparation in damages to private persons who
have been injured in their property. If horses had been taken
from non-combatants (by impressment) for military service, it
would hardly be maintained that those who did it would be liable
personally to the owners. Nor would the courts give a remedy
to restore these animals to their former owners, if at the close of
the war they were found in the possession of citizens who derived
a right through the military, as by a quartermaster's sale of condemned property.
The circumstance that the provost-marshal published the order
to the people of Adams county, indicates that they were in sympathy with its motive and purpose, and that serious difficulties
would not be encountered in carrying it out. Nor can it be
doubted that if he had not the means at hand to overcome opposition and resistance that ample force would have been promptly
supplied.
Necessarily there were many excesses of authority, abuses of
power, and wrongs done during the late war. In this the greatest
struggle of arms of modern times, employing the utmost energies
and resources of the people, when nearly all of them in one form
or another were participating in the struggle, when the courts
for the most part were closed, and the laws in the midst of arms
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were silent, or if they spoke at all, uttered but a feeble voice; it
is not to be expected that in all circumstances personal rights and
private property would be scrupulously respected, or that those
who acted under military orders were at all times discreet and
forbearing.
We do not think that it would be wise to encourage the exhuming of such transactions of those distempered times for adjudications in the courts.
Any other doctrine than that we have announced, as the result
of mature reflection, would flood the courts with suits for compensation for property taken or destroyed during the war. That so
few have been brought is persuasive that the conclusion of law
we have reached has been sanctioned by the judgment and conscience of the community. It commends itself to the reason,
and is promotive of quietude and charity one towards another.
We have examined the cases referred to by counsel at the argument, reported in 2d and 4th West Virginia Rep., also the
Louisiana Case. With deference and respect for these learned
courts, we are constrained to the belief that the courts failed to
apprehend and apply the correct principle of law to the facts
before them.
We have looked to the pleas solely with reference to their substance and not to their structure and technical sufficiency. So
they were treated by counsel at the argument.
Let the judgment be affirmed.

Supreme Court of the United States.
FRANK B. MYERS v. JOHN T. CROFT.
The pre-emptor of territorial land under the Act of Congress of September 4th
1841, is restrained from aliening it (with certain exceptions) before entry in the
land office, bat after entry he may sell and pass a valid title without waiting for
the issup of his patent.
The competency of a corporation, grantee, to take title to land, cannot be
disputed by a grantor who has delivered a deed and received the consideration, or
by any one claiming through him by subsequent conveyance.

Ix error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.

MTERS v. CROFT.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-This is an action of ejectment, to try the title to a
quarter section of land in Nebraska. Both parties derived
title throtgh William Penn Fraily. The plaintiff below, who is
also the plaintiff in this court, by deed from Fraily to himself, of
the 12th of June 1860; the defendant, by deed from Fraily to
the Sulphur Springs Land Company, of the 3d day of September
1857. It was admitted at the trial, to save the trouble of proving
the facts, that on the 3d day of September 1857, Fraily entered the premises "in
question at the United States Land Office
for the Omaha land district, with the register thereof, under and
by virtue of an Act of Congress, entitled "An Act to appropriate
the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, and to grant preemption rights," approved September 4th 1841, and that the
usual letters patent of the United States were issued on the 1st
day of May 1860, to said Fraily, under his said entry. On this
state of the case the court instructed the jury that the title passed
by the deed to the Sulphur Springs Land Company, as it was
prior in point of time, and told them to find a verdict for the
defendant. The plaintiff in error contends that this instruction
was erroneous, because, in the first place, the Sulphur Springs
Land Company was not a competent grantee to receive the title,
and, secondly, if it was competent, that the deed to it was, nevertheless, void, for the reason that it was made before the patent
issued. In relation to the first objection it is sufficient to say, in
the absence of any proof whatever on the subject, that it will be
presumed the land company was capable, in law, to take a conveyance of real estate; besides, neither Fraily, who made the
deed, nor Myers, who claims under him, is in a position to question the capacity of the company to take the title after it has
paid to Fraily full value for the property: Smith v. Sheeley, decided December Term 1871.
The other objection is of a more serious character, and depends
for its solution upon the construction to be given the last clause
of the 12th section of the Act of Congress of September 4th
1841, above referred to. The act itself is one of a series of preemption laws conferring upon the actual settler upon a quarter
section of public land the privilege (enjoyed by no one else) of
purchasing it, on complying with certain prescribed conditions.
It had been the well-defined policy of Congress, in passing these
DAVIS,
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laws, not to allow their benefit to enure to the profit of land
speculators, but this wise policy was often defeated. Experience
had proved that designing persons, being unable to purchase
valuable lands, on account of their withdrawal from sale, would
procure middlemen to occupy them temporarily, with indifferent
,improvements, under an agreement to convey them so soon as
they were entered by virtue of their pre-emption rights. When
this was done, and the speculation accomplished, the lands were
abandoned.
This was felt to be a serious evil, and Congress, in the law
under consideration, undertook to remedy it by requiring of the
applicant for a pre-emption, before he was allowed to enter the
land on which he had settled, to swear that he had not contracted
it away, nor settled upon it to sell it on speculation, but, in good
faith, to appropriate it to his own use. In case of false swearing
the pre-emptor was subject to a prosecution for perjury, and forfeited the money he had paid for the land; and any grant or
conveyance made by him before the entry was declared null and
void, with an exception in favor of bond fide purchasers for a
valuable consideration. It is contended by the plaintiff in error
that Congress went further in this direction, and imposed also a
restriction upon the power of alienation after the er.hn, and the
last clause in thle 12th section of the act is cited to support the
position.
This section, after prescribing the manner in which the proof
of settlement and improvement shall be made before the land is
entered, has this proviso: " and all assignments and transfers of
the right hereby secured prior to the issuing of the patent shall
be null and void."
The inquiry is, what did the legislature intend by this prohibition? Did it mean to disqualify the pre-emptor who had entered
the land from selling it at all until he had obtained his patent, or
did the disability extend only to the assignment of the pre-emption
right? Looking at the language employed, as well as the policy
of Congress on the subject, it would seem that the interdiction
was intended to apply to the right secured by the act, and did
not go further. This was the right to pre-empt a quarter section
of land by settling upon and improving it, at the minimum price,
no matter what its value might be when the time limited for perfecting the pre-emption expired. This right was valuable, and
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independently of the legislation of Congress assignable: Thredgill v. Pintard, 12 How. 24. The object of' Congress was
attained when the pre-emptor went, with clean hands, to the
land office and proved up his right, and paid the government for
his land. Restriction upon the power of alienation after this
would injure the pre-emptor, and could serve no important purpose of public policy. It is well known that patents do not issue
in the usual course of business in the General Land Office until
several years after the certificate of entry is given; and equally
well known that nearly all the valuable lands in the new states,
admitted since 1841, have been taken up under the pre-emption
laws, and the right to sell them freely exercised after the claim
was proved up, the land paid for, and the certificate of entry
received. In view of these facts we cannot suppose, in the
absence of an express declaration to that effect, that Congress
intended to tie up these lands in the hands of the original owners,
until the government should choose to issue the patent.
If it had been the purpose of Congress to attain the object
contended for, it would have declared the lands themselves
unalienable until the patent was granted. Instead of this, the
legislation was directed against the assignment or transfer of the
right secured by the act, which was the right of pre-emption,
leaving the pre-emptor free to sell his land after the entry, if at
that time he was, in good faith, the owner of the land, and had
done nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the law on the
subject.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Supreme Judicial Court of Afassachusetts.
GEORGE PEABODY

ET AL.

v. CHARLES K. HAMILTON.

A person not a citizen of the United States or a temporary resident of, or commorant in the state in which the action is brought, but a resident and citizen of
the kingdom of Great Britain, may bring an action against a person not a resident of the state, or having property therein subject to attachment, for a cause of
action not local in its nature, where service of the process by which the suit is
commenced is made on the defendant personally within the state.
The iet that a plaintiff is not a resident of a state or personally present in it
and is a resident and citizen in the kingdom of Great Britain, does not disqualify
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him for bringing a suit therein against a citizen of the United States, but a nonresident of the state in which the action is brought and having no property therein
subject to attachment.
The fact that a defendant is not a resident of a state and has no property therein
subject to attachment, is not a reason why he cannot be sued in the state in a
transitory action by a plaintiff not a citizen of or resident in the United States,
if only he be personally served with process within the state.
It is not necessary that a person should be a resident of a state or of the Umted
States, or that he should be personally present in a state, in order that he may he
entitled to bring an action against a defendant who is not a resident of the state
and who has no property in it subject to attachment, if only the defendan . 7)e
found and served with process within the state.
Process for the commencement of a suit may be served on the defendant, a nonresident of the state on board a foreign vessel at her dock and before she is moored
to it, and such service is good even if the defendant be only transiently within the
jurisdiction, on his way from a foreign country to his residence in another state
of the Union.
Accordingly, where the defendant, a citizen and resident of New York, was
served with process on board an English steamer, bound from Liverpool, England,
to Boston, at her dock in East Boston (in the waters of the state of Massachusetts),
before she was moored and while defendant was journeying from Halifax, Nova
Scotia, to his home in New York, said vessel being a "British mail steamer"
Held, that such service was good and that it gave the court jurisdiction.

TE declaration in this case was for one hundred thousand
pounds sterling due on account annexed.
Also for one hundred thousand pounds sterling money paid by
plaintiffs to the use of defendant and for interest and commissions
thereon.
The defendant appeared personally for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, and pleaded that the plaintiffs
were merchants, residents and citizens of London, in the kingdom of Great Britain; that defendant was a resident and citizen
of New Brighton, in the state of New York; that neither is or
was at the time of the service of the writ a citizen or temporary
resident or commorant in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
or within the jurisdiction of this court; that the defendant at
that time had neither property nor estate subject to attachment
within said jurisdiction; and further, that the service of said
writ was made on him by the officer handing him a summons in
hand while he was on board the English steamer China, bound
from Liverpool, England, to Boston, and immediately after said
steamer had reached her dock in East Boston and before she was
moored to her dock; that he was journeying from Halifax, Nova
Scotia, to his home in New York; that said steamer was at that
time and still is a British mail steamer.
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To this plea the plaintiff demurred generally.
The case was heard first at the Special Term, and reserved for
the determination of and heard by the full court.

Charles A. Peabody (of New York) and Charles G. Thomas,
for plaintiffs.
Sidney Bartlett and .Robert D. Smith, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WELLS, J.-That both parties are foreigners is no ground for
dismissing the writ: Boberts v. Knight, 7 Allen 449. It is not
necessary that a foreign plaintiff should be personally within the
jurisdiction in order to institute an action. The statute requires
only that he shall furnish an endorser to his writ, who is an
inhabitant of the state: Gen. Stats., c. 123, § 20.
Personal actions, of a transitory nature, may be maintained in
any jurisdiction within which the defendant is found, so that process is legally served upon him: Story on Conflict of Laws,
§§ 543, 554; Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354; W~right v.
Oakley, 5 Met. 400.
This we understand to be the general rule of the common law.
Such is also the clear implication of the statutes of this Commonwealth. The restriction in Gen. Stats., c. 126, § 1, that a party
defendant must have been, before the time of action brought, an
inhabitant of the state, or that an effectual attachment must be
made of his goods, estate, or effects, has application only to actions
"against a person who is out of the state at the time of the service of the summons."
When the party is in the state, however transiently, and the
summons is actually served upon him there, the jurisdiction of
the court is complete as to the person of the defendant. In the
numerous discussions of the force and effect of judgments, rendered in one of the United States against citizens of another
state, this has been repeatedly and always recognised as sufficient
to give full jurisdiction in transitory actions: JHall v. Wfilliams,
6 Pick. 232, 241 ; Gleeson v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333, 338 ; Eu'er v.
(offin, 1 Cush. 23; Barringer v. Kfing, 5 Gray 9; Ca'lton v.
Bickford, 13 Gray 591.
We do not find that the statement of the case in Barrellv.
Benjamin bears out the assertion upon the defendant's brief that
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"it was a case where both parties were transiently resident here."
On the contrary, it does not appear from the agreed facts that
the plaintiff, who resided in Connecticut, was at the time in Massachusetts at air; and the defendant, a native of Connecticut,
then a resident of Demarara, at the time of his arrest "was in
loston, on his way to Demarara."
The objection of the defendant, as stated by the court, was,
that he was not resident in the state, but was arrested "when
here only for the purpose of embarking for Demarara." And
the court say, "we see no way of upholding the distinction, and
there is nothing to be found in the books to support it."
Some consideration, it is true, was given in that case to the
fact that the plaintiff was a citizen of a sisterstate, and as such,
under the Federal Constitution, entitled to all the rights of a
citizen of Massachusetts. But the right of a non-resident to sue
in our courts is not regarded in Roberts v. Knight, 7 Allen 449, as
depending upon considerations of that nature. We cannot consider the fact that the plaintiffs in this case were residents of a
foreign country, as having any weight upon the legal question of
jurisdiction.
The defendant calls attention to a remark of the court in Putnam v. Dike, 13 Gray 535, as indicating that, upon a plea to the
jurisdiction, the action could not have been maintained against
a non-resident if he had never been an iihabitant of the state,
and there was no effectual attachment of his property in the suit.
But in that case, as it is stated by the court, there was "no evidence to show that the defendant ever came within the limits of
this state." Of course there could have been no service of the
summons upon him. It appears'from the files in that case that
there was in fact no such service.
Upon the question of jurisdiction, in its international aspect,
we are satisfied that the service of the process, by summons
merely, is equally effective with an attachment or arrest of the
body.
The defendants contend that service by a separate summons,
after a nominal attachment only, is not authorized by statute:
Gen. Stats., c. 123, §§ 10, 11.
The proceeding is, in form, a literal compliance with the statute.
We understand it to be in accordance with long-established, general practice: Howe's Practice 61. It appears to be recognised
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ai a proper mode of service: Belknap v. Gibbons, 13 Met. 471,
475; Orcutt v. Bamney, 10 Cush. 183.
No case is cited in which it has ever been held that such service is not good. The language of the provision does not necessarily import " an effectual attachment," such as is required to
give jurisdiction against an absent defendant who was never an
inhabitant. See chap. 126, § 1. For this purpose of determining the proper mode of service, the return of the officer that lie
had attached the property of the defendant cannot be contradicted by evidence, and is not contradicted by the apparent want
of value in the article returned as attached.
The defendant also objects to the service, because it was made
upon him while he was still on board a British mail steam vessel,
and "immediately after said steamer had reached her dock in
East Boston, and before she was moored to her dock." But we
are unable to see any force in this objection. Whatever jurisdiction the English courts may be authorized to exercise over controversies arising between English subjects or others, on board
English vessels while in foreign ports; and whatever comity may
be properly exercised in remitting such controversies for adjudication to the domestic tribunals, there can be no doubt that the
defendant was strictly within the jurisdiction of this court, liable
to its process, and that he was properly served with it on board
the foreign vessel: Commonwealth v. Peters, 12 Met. 387.
But if there were any discretion in the court, as a court of
law, in regard to the matter either on the ground of general
comity, or of the nature of the controversy, the question is not
presented upon a plea in abatement for insufficient or defective
service of the writ.
Demurrer sustained.

Circuit Court United )tates.

-Eastern-Districtof Pennslylvania.

DOLL v. EVANS

ET AL.

An assessor of internal revenue has power to reassess an income tax where he
is satisfied it is incorrect, although the party has paid the tax first assessed against
him.
Where the assessor finds the first return to bc false or fraudulent, it is his duty
to add a penalty of one hundred per cent. on the second assessment.
The Act of Congress which imposes an addition of one hundred per centum to
the tax, as a penalty for the " return of a false or fraudulent list or valuation,"
is constitutional.
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DEMiURRER to plea.

N. Hf. Sl/arpless, for demurrer.
Aubrey .. Smith, District Attorney, contr'.The opinion of the court was delivered, by
MOKENNAN, C. J.-This demurrer presents only two questions
which it is necessary to consider. 1. Has an assessor of internal
revenue power to reassess the income tax of a citizen, who has
paid the tax first assessed against him ? And 2. Is the Act of
Congress, which imposes an addition of one hundred per centum
to the tax, as a penalty for the "return of a false or fraudulent
list or valuation," constitutional?
The defendants' plea avers, that the plaintiff made a return of
his income for the year 1868, to the assessor of the third collection district of Pennsylvania; that he was thereupon assessed
with an income tax of $95.60, which was placed by the assessor
on the annual list; that this list was delivered to the collector, to
whom the plaintiff paid the tax so charged against him; that
afterwards and within fifteen months after the delivery of said
list to the collector, to wit, on the 21st October 1869, the assessor
duly summoned and required the plaintiff to appear before him
at his office in Philadelphia, on the 25th October 1869, to produce
all books of accounts, containing entries of profits from business,
rents, &c., relating to his income and business from January 1st
1868, to December 81st 1868, which he had in his power, custody,
or care, and to give evidence according to his knowledge respecting his liability to an excise or tax, under the internal revenue
laws; that the plaintiff did not appear in pursuance of said notice,
whereupon the assessor proceeded to make, according to the best
information he could obtain, and to his own view and information,
a list or return of the income, gains and profits of the plaintiff
for the year 1868, and did assess thereupon and charge to the
plaintiff the sum of $482.84, in addition to the $95.60 before
assessed, as his income tax, and did further add thereto the sum
of $482.84, being one hundred per centum, as and for a penalty
for having made the false and fraudulent list, statement, or return
as aforesaid; that afterwards, to wit, on the 20th diy of April
1870, the said assessor certified and delivered to the defendant,
George C. Evans, as collector, a certain list, called the monthly
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list, for the month of ':larch 1870, on which was charged to the
plaintiff the sum of $965.68, being the additional amount of his
income tax for the year 1868, so reassessed, and the penalty
aforesaid; that the said collector duly notified the plaintiff of the
said charge, and demanded payment thereof on or before the
last day of April 1870; that the plaintiff did not pay the same,
and that the defendant afterwards, on the 9th day of May 1870,
proceeded to collect the same by distraint of the goods and chattels mentioned in the declaration.
The demurrer admits the truth of these facts, and the sufficiency
of the plea, therefore, depends upon the legal authority of the
assessor to reassess the plaintiff's income tax, and to add one
hundred per centum thereto. If the law conferred this power
upon the assessor, the list made out, certified, and delivered by
him to the collector was a sufficient warrant to the latter to
demand and collect the tax charged therein, and constituted a
complete justification of the seizure of the plaintiff's goods. The
collector is responsible only for the possession of authority by the
assessor to make the reassessment, not for his conformity to the
directory provisions of the law, as to the mode of its exercise.
This question is to be solved by the construction of the Internal
Revenue Act of June 30th 1864. The 20th section of that act
authorizes an additional or reassessment of income tax, within
fifteen months after the delivery of the annual list to the collector,
in all cases in which it is incomplete, or imperfect, in consequence
of any omission, understatement, undervaluation, or false or
fraudulent return made by any person liable to said tax. The
terms of this section are certainly broad enough to embrace the
case stated in the plea, but it is urged that it was not intended to
apply to the case of persons who have paid the amount of the
original assessment.
The only limitation of the power of the assessor relates to the
period within which it is to be exercised, and the cases to which
it is to be applied. Within the prescribed period and in the
specified cases, it is coextensive with the power vested in him in
reference to the original assessment. The object of the law is to
confer upon him ample corrective cognisance of all omissions,
understatements, undervaluations, falsehood or fraud in income
returns, upon which the tax has been assessed and charged in the
collector's list, within fifteen months, to the end that every tax-
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payer may be subjected to his proper proportion of a public
burden. To make the payment of less than this effective as a
discharge from liability for a further sum, which ought rightfully
to have been paid, and which has been avoided by the fraudulent
act of the person subject to taxation, would be to circumscribe
the scope of the law, against its obvious intent. An express
restriction alone could have this effect, and that is not to be found
in the act.
But it is evident from the tenor of the act, that it contemplates
the exercise of the power of reassessment after the payment of
the tax first assessed. It is made the duty of the assessor to
require a return of income on or before a fixed day in each year,
and to make out, certify, and deliver to the collector a list of the
taxes charged therein. This is called the annual list, and afteits delivery to the collector, it is in nowise subject to the control
of the assessor. It is then the duty of the collector to proceed
at once to the collection of the tax charged on this list, and to
enforce prompt payment of it. The whole process of assessment
and collection is intended to be completed within the year in
which the assessment is made. Now, at any time within fifrtee,
months after the annual list is delivered to the collector a reassessment may be made, and only the additional tax thus ascertained
is to be charged and put on another list, called the monthly list.
By this extension of the period for reassessment beyond the time
when the original tax must be paid, and the provision for the collection of the additional tax only upon the monthly list, it is
apparent that the assessor's power of reassessment is to be exercised independently of the fact of the payment or non-payment
of the tax charged in the annual list.
It follows, therefore, that the additional tax assessed upon the
plaintiff vas authorized by the Act of Congress. And the ret-arn
made by him having been found to be false,, it was the imperative
duty of the assessor to add one hundred per centum, as directed
by the 14th section of the act.
The remaining cause of demurrer is, that the Act of Congress,
in so far as it imposes a penalty for a false or fraudulent return,
is unconstitutional. The act does not invest the assessor with
power to "sentence" anybody; it does not even allow him any
discretion as to the penal increase of the tax. It authorizes him
to inquire whether the return is false or fraudulent, and if he so
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finds, requires him to add one hundred per centum to the tax.
This is not conferring judicial power upon him, within the meaning of the Constitution. It is simply empowering him to ascertain
a fact, according to which he is to adjust the amount of the tax
imposed by law. That this function is judicial in its nature there
is no doubt, but so are many like functions committed to public
officers, as essential to the performance of their official duties.
They are within the competency of Congress to confer, as necessarily incident to the execution of its expressly granted powers.
The Acts of Congress furnish many examples of this. They
are to be found especially in the laws relating to the collection of
customs; and the validity of such legislation has never been
denied. A single illustration will show this. By Act of Congress collectors of customs are authorized to assess an additional
duty of twenty per cent. upon goods valued by the appraisers at
ten per cent. or more in excess of the value declared by the importer in the invoice and entry. The validity of an appraisement made and an additional duty imposed under this act, was
before the Supreme Court in Bartlett v. Zane, 16 How. 269.
Judge CAMPBELL delivering the opinion of the court said, "the
plaintiff contends that the rule of appraisement by which the
dutiable value of the goods was raised and the importer was subjected to the additional duty prescribed by the 8th section of the
Act of 1846, was illegal and void, and the duties thus claimed
and paid under said appraisement were illegally exacted. * * *
The appraisers are appointed ' with powers, by all reasonable
ways and means, to ascertain, estimate, and appraise the true
market value and wholesale price' of the importation. The exercise of these powers involves knowledge, judgment, and discretion." And again, "an examination of the revenue laws upon
the subject of levying additional duties, in consequence of the
fact of an undervaluation by the importer, shows that they were
exacted as discouragements to fraud, and to prevent efforts by
importers to escape the legal rates of duty. * * * They are the
compensation for a violated law, and are designed to operate as
checks and restraints upon fraud and injustice." And the legality
of the appraisement and of the imposition of the penal duty was
sustained. That the powers thus exercised by the appraisers are
judicial in their nature is beyond question, for so the court distinctly treats them. They decided the fact, that the importer's
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invoice was false, and thereupon the collector imposed upon him
a penal duty of twenty per cent. And yet the court upheld the
exercise of these powers by the appraisers and collector, without
intimating a doubt of the validity of the law conferring them.
Their conclusion is a most expressive affirmance of the validity
of such legislation. So also, in the present case, the investiture
of the assessor with analogous functions must be sustained, as
auxiliary to the execution of the same constitutional grant of
power to Congress.
Judgment upon the demurrer will, therefore, be entered for thedefendants.

United States Distriet Cu'rt.

V'estern District of Missouri.

UNITED STATES v. S. P. DOSS ET AL.

Where a United States officer holding a prisoner by United States authority is
served with a writ of habeas corpus issued by state authority, it is his duty to make
due return to the writ; and he acts within the true spirit of the law by producing
the body of his prisoner before the court or judge issuing the writ.
Where such officer makes return showing that he holds the prisoner by United
States authority, the state authority should abstain from longer interfering with
the case, and all its proceedings thereafter are illegal.
Where a prisoner is held for an offence over which the United States and the
state in which it was committed have concurrent jurisdiction, the government
which first assumes jurisdiction will retain it until final judgment.
If a state judge, in combination with others, misuse his position and office by
making use of the law and his power for the purpose of accomplishing an improper
release, he, and those acting with him, are liable criminally for obstructing process of the United States.
But if the judge acts bond fide he is not liable criminally, notwithstanding his
acts are illegal for want of jurisdiction.
Where a prisoner is brought before a judge in obedience to a writ of habeas
corpus, he is under the control of the judge, the writ of habeas corpus having
superseded the original process, and therefore, a person taking charge of the
prisoner under the order of the judge issuing the writ, cannot, for that act alone,
be held guilty of obstructing United States process.

TniE charge of the court to the jury contains a sufficient statement of the case.
James S. Botsford, District Attorney, and H. B. Johnson, for
the United States.
Ewing & Smith and Philips, for the defendants.
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KnEKL, J., charged the jury as follows :-

The first count of the indictment charges that Doss, McAfee,
Snow and Wray, did knowingly and wilfully obstruct, resist, and
oppose McConoughey, United States Deputy Marshal, in serving,
and while attempting to serve and execute a warrant of commitment on Samuel Snow.
The second count charges the same defendants with rescuing
said Samuel Snow by force from said marshal, who held him under
warrant of commitment.
These charges hre based upon an Act of Congress, which provides: "If any person shall knowingly or wilfully obstruct, resist,
or oppose any officer of the United States in serving or attempting
to serve or execute any measure, p'oc.,s or warrant, or any rule
or order of any of the courts of the United States, or any other
legal or judicial process whatever. * * * Every person so knowingly or wilfully offending in the premises, shall, on conviction,
be imprisoned not exceeding twelve months, and fined not exceeding three hundred dollars."
"Or if any person or persons shall by force set at liberty or
rescue any person committed for, or convicted of, any offence
against the United States, every person so offending shall, on
conviction, be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, and imprisoned not exceeding one year."
It appears that one Samuel Snow was arrested on a warrant
issued by United States Commissioner Birdseye, upon affidavit
filed by one Morris, charging said Snow with having in his possession for the purpose qf passing as genuine certain counterfeit
obligations of the United States.
Snow was brought before the commissioner on the 20th day of
September 1871, who continued the hearing of the case to the
30th of the same month. Upon an examination then had, said
Snow was bound over for his appearance before the District Court
for the Western District of 'Missouri, to answer an indictment if
found. Snow gave bail in the sum of one thousand dollars, with
two of the present defendants, Wray and David Snow, the latter
the father of Samuel Snow, as sureties. Afterwards, under an
Act of Congress, which provides:
"That any party charged with a criminal offence and admitted
to bail, may in vacation be arrested by his bail and delivered to
the marslal or his deputy before any judge or other officer having
VOL. XX.-21
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power to commit for such an offence, and,j at the request of such
bail, the judge or other officer shall recommit the party arrested
to the custody of the United States marshal; and he shall hold
him until discharged in due course of law." Samuel Snow was
surrendered by his sureties to the commissioner, Birdseye, who
delivered him to the deputy marshal, and failing to give bond was
committed by the deputy marshal to the jail of Vernon county
for safe keeping, until he could be removed to the county jail of
St. Louis county.
On the day of the surrendering of said Samuel Snow by his
sureties, a writ of habeas corpus was sued out before the probate
judge of Vernon county, the defendant AlcAfee, on petition of the
said Samuel Snow, under the statute of Missouri, which provides
that the applicant for the benefit of the writ shall state under
6ath in substance, by whom the party for whom relief is prayed
is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, and the place where,
naming the parties, all the facts concerning the imprisonment or
restraint, and the true cause thereof, and if the imprisonment is
alleged to be illegal, in what the illegality consists.
Samuel Snow, in his petition for the benefit of the writ of
habeas corpus, says that he was arrested by one Mconoughey
upon some process, or pretended process (charging him with an
attempt to pass counterfeit money), issued by one Birdseye, and
that he is now restrained of his liberty at the county of Vernon
for no crime or criminal matter. The law required him to set
out all the facts concerning the imprisonment and the true cause
thereof. You will observe how carefully this petition, in spite
of the provision of the statute quoted, seeks to withhold the facts,
well known to the petitioner, that a United States Commissioner,
Birdseye, had acted in his case, and that he was in the custody
of the United States deputy marshal, McConoughey.
The evidence as to the time at which the affidavit annexed to
the petition was sworn to, and also how he accounts for his failing to comply with another requirement of the statutes, that if
he was restrained or confined by virtue of any warrant, order, or
process, a copy thereof must accompany the petition, is before
you. Had this part of the statute law been complied with, the
judge who issued the writ of habeas corpus could at &
iave
seen what kind of case he was dealing with, and he m
., well
have refused the writ, under that clause of the Missouri statutes
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providing that if it appears that the party cannot be discharged
or otherwise relieved, the writ shall be denied.
All these plain provisions of the statutes were staring those
engaged in obtaining the benefits of the writ for Samuel Snow in
the face at the time of the application. When the return to the
writ was made-so full and pointed-it should have arrested attention, especially as the jurisdictional question fully appeared. The
return fully sets out all the facts and circumstances of the arrest,
the examination, the holding to bail, the surrender of bail,.and
the recommitment, the cause of the restraint by a United States
commissioner (a duly authorized judicial officer of the United
States). It was presented by the law officer of the government.
I shall not stop to examine as to what has been said in the discussion of the adjudicated cases as to whether a United States
marshal, holding a prisoner under due process of the United
States-as Snow was held-is bound to produce the body of the
person so detained or imprisoned, together with the time and
cause of his imprisonment and detention, as required by the Missouri statutes and the writ, for whatever the law may be the good
understanding that should ever exist between the state and National Government and its judiciaries should govern rather than
the law. The officers of the National Government acted properly
and in the true spirit of the law in producing the body of Samuel
Snow, and the cause of his restraint and detention, thus putting
the probate judge fully in possession of the case. When that
was done, and the return not denied, for the paper filed the next
day can scarcely be called a denial, the probate judge should have
abstained from longer interfering with the case. His acts thereafter were illegal. The Missouri Statute in its 35th section of
the Habeas Corpus Act provides, That if it appear that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally
constituted, or issued by any officer in the course of judicial proceeding before him, such prisoner can only be discharged on one
of the following cases:First. Where the jurisdiction of such court or officer has been
exceeded either as to matter, place, sum, or person.
Second. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful,
yet by some act, omission, or event which has taken place afterwards, the party has become entitled to be discharged.
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Third. Where the process is defective in some matter of substance required by law, rendering such process void.
Fourth. Where the process, though in proper form, has been
issued in a case, or under circumstances not allowed by law.
Fifth. Where the process, though in proper form, has been
issued or executed by a person who is not authorized by law to
issue or execute the same, or where the person having the custody
of such prisoner under such process is not the person empowered
by law to detain him.
Sixth. Where the process is not authorized by any judgment,
order or decree, nor by any provision of law.
It most manifestly appeared that the process of the United
States Commissioner was issued by an officer in the course of
judicial proceedings before him. This has not in any manner
been questioned.
By the most liberal construction that can be given to the six
classes of cases under which a prisoner may be discharged, not
one can be found within which the case before Judge McAFEE
could be brought.
These provisions plainly repudiate the discharge of the prisoner.
Such a law as the one quoted, and the enforcement thereof, is an
absolute necessity, for where would the interference stop if judicial officers, who had the right to issue the writ of habeas corpus,
had nothing to guide them but their own discretion ?
Every jail in the land would be emptied if it was not for such
or similar provisions of law, limiting and restraining the exercise
of judicial discretion.
It is asked, is it supposable that a United States Commissioner
can take a citizen of a state, and he have no redress through its
own legal tribunals ? Under our system we are citizens of the
General Government first, and as such we owe paramount allegiance to it. It is a mistake to suppose that the National Government operates on citizens of a state. It operates on its own
citizens, and enforces its laws upon them as such. But this danger of oppression from the National Government is more imaginary
than real. Thus, for instance, there are not less than three judges
who could have fully examined into and corrected any error which
the United States Commissioner might have committed. The
judges of the Eastern and Western Districts, in their capacity
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as Circuit Court judges, could have acted besides the Circuit
Court judge proper.
Missouri is most favorably situated in respect to the national
judiciary. If the people of one district should from any cause
distrust the judge of their own district, they need only apply to
the other, who as circuit judge has jurisdiction over the whole
state.
Reference has been made to the concurrent jurisdiction in
many cases exercised by the Federal and State judiciary, and the
case in which the present proceeding had its origin is one of that
class. The debasing of the currency of the country is an evil
which affects all alike, citizens of the state as well as of the United
States. Is it strange that Congress and state legislatures should
be alike willing to provide a remedy? In applying such remedy
no conflict can ever arise, for the well-known rule is, to leave
jurisdiction to the tribunal first obtaining it. Had Samuel Snow
in this case been arrested by state authority, no one would ever
have thought of disturbing or interfering with the rightfullyacquired jurisdiction. To deduce from these concessions the right
of the state judiciary to interfere with first and rightfully-obtained
jurisdiction of the United States, would be the reversing of both
the intent and legal rule.
Let us now return to the real question in issue: How far can
a judicial officer of a state justify his interference in the judicial
proceedings of the United States? As a matter of course, if
Judge McAFEE, in combination with others, misused his position
and office by making use of the law and his power for the purpose of accomplishing an improper release of Samuel Snow, and
you are fully satisfied of that fact, defendant McAFEE, and those
who acted with him, are guilty of having obstructed the process
under the first count of the indictment.
If, on the other hand, you should come to the conclusion that
there was no combination between all of these defendants, but
that there was such a combination between two or more of them,
then you should find as many as entered into the combination
(not less than two) guilty, under the first count of the indictment.
If you shall find that no conspiracy or combination for the purpose stated existed among any of the defendants, you will next
inquire, whether any, and if so, how many arc guilty of having obstructe(l the process of the United States under the first count
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of the indictment, or by force rescued under the second count.
In considering the acts of the probate judge you are instructed
that the law is that if he-acted bondfide, that is, in good faith, he
is not answerable, and you should find him not guilty. ie was
bound to act on the. application made to him for the writ of habeas
,corpus, and if he erred in granting the writ, or in the proceedings had before him under it, for that error he is not responsible
in these proceedings. In a late decision as to the custody of a
prisoner pending the hearing of a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Barth et al. v. Clise, held,
that by the common law upon the return of a writ of habeas
corpus, and the production of the body of the party suing it out,
the authority under which the original commitment took place is
superseded. After that time, and until the case is finally disposed of, the safe-keeping of the prisoner is entirely under the
control and direction of the court to which the return is made;
that the prisoner is detained not under the original commitment,
but under the authority of the writ of habeas corpus; that pending bearing he may be bailed de die in diem, or be remanded to
the jail whence he came, or be committed to any other suitable
place of confinement under the control of the court.
It would seem that, under the entire control thus given to the
court over the prisoner, the judge may direct any person to take
charge of, and hold the prisoner until the case is finally disposed
of. The person thus holding the prisoner must of necessity be
able to justify for the simple act of holding under the order of
the court, and if you shall find that Wray did nothing else than
hold the prisoner under order of the court, for that act alone
he should not be found guilty of obstructing the process of the
United States. But this ruling of the Supreme Court of the
United States also affects the acts of the other defendants. However much the allusion to wire-pulling by Doss, or that to force by
Wight or the reference to the power behind 'the throne of the district attorney, may lead you to understand what was transpiring
in that court at a time when men of cool, dispassionate judgment
were sadly needed, yet the decision referred to relieves the judge,
Doss and Wight of having obstructed process, for if the prisoner
was in the custody of the court they could not be guilty of obstructing process of the United States. The case then comes
back to the first proposition, was there a e !spiracy or combina-

